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BILATTICES AND THE 
SEMANTICS OF LOGIC PROGRAMMING 
MELVIN FITTING* 
D Bilattices, due to M. Ginsberg, are a family of truth-value spaces that 
allow elegantly for missing or conflicting information. The simplest exam- 
ple is Belnap’s four-valued logic, based on classical two-valued logic. 
Among other examples are those based on finite many-valued logics and 
on probabilistic-valued logic. A fixed-point semantics is developed for logic 
programming, allowing any bilattice as the space of truth values. The 
mathematics is little more complex than in the classical two-valued setting, 
but the result provides a natural semantics for distributed logic programs, 
including those involving confidence factors. The classical two-valued and 
the Kripke-Kleene three-valued semantics become special cases, since the 
logics involved are natural sublogics of Belnap’s logic, the logic given by 
the simplest bilattice. a 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Often useful information is spread over a number of sites (“Does anybody know, 
did Willie wear a hat when he left this morning?“) that can be specifically 
addressed (“I’m not just talking to hear myself talk; I’m asking you, you, and 
you.“). Sometimes information is collective (“I know where he keeps his hat when 
he isn’t wearing it.” “ I know it’s not there now.“). Sometimes things are more 
direct (“Yes he did.“). All this is routine. But problems arise when answers conflict 
and must be reconciled. Reasonable possibilities are: if anyone says yes then it’s 
yes; if anyone says no, then it’s no. These correspond to the classical truth-func- 
tional connectives V and A. But equally reasonable are: different answers tell me 
nothing; different answers tell me too much. These versions leave the realm of 
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classical logic behind. In fact, a four-valued logic was introduced by Belnap [3] for 
precisely this purpose. 
Logic programs can be distributed over many sites, and can exhibit behavior like 
that considered in the previous paragraph. It turns out that a simple fixed-point 
semantics, similar to that of [21] and [l], can be developed, based on Belnap’s logic 
(see [4] for a version). But we need not stop here. Van Emden has proposed using 
real numbers in [O, l] as quantitative truth values [20]. How should such a 
truth-value space be modified if programs are distributed? Similar issues arise for 
any choice of truth-value space, of course. 
M. Ginsberg has invented the elegant notion of bilattice [14,15], which deals 
with precisely this issue. We reserve the definition till later on, but for motivation 
we note: Belnap’s four-valued logic constitutes the simplest bilattice; a natural 
bilattice can be constructed based on any “reasonable” truth-value space; bilattices 
provide a truth-value mechanism suitable for information that contains conflicts or 
gaps; and a logic-programming fixed-point semantics can be developed relative to 
any bilattice, rather easily at that. Demonstrating the truth of these assertions 
occupies the bulk of this paper. 
Several varieties of fixed-point semantics have been proposed for logic program- 
ming. The traditional one has been classical two-valued [l, 211. This is very 
satisfactory when negations are not allowed in clause bodies. A three-valued 
semantics has been urged [7,8,17,18] as a way of coping with the problems of 
negation. Also, the two-valued semantics has been extended via the device of 
stratification [2]. See [12] and [13] for a discussion of the relationship between the 
stratified and the three-valued approach. More recently a four-valued logic has 
been proposed, to allow for programs containing inconsistencies [5]. Also, the set 
of reals in [0, 11 has been used as a kind of truth-value space, to allow treating 
confidence factors as truth values [201. And in [lo], sets of possible worlds in a 
Kripke model were considered, as something like evidence factors. What do these 
approaches have in common? There must be enough machinery to ensure the 
existence of fixed points of the operator associated with a program. This means a 
partial ordering meeting special conditions must exist. [4] is a nice study of this 
point, and the wide range of circumstances under which the necessary conditions 
are obtained. But for the machinery to work smoothly, there must be an appropri- 
ate interaction between the logical operations allowed in the programming lan- 
guage and the underlying partial ordering. This is an issue addressed here. We 
claim that bilattices apply naturally to most of the kinds of fixed-point semantics 
people have considered, and provide an account of the intended partial ordering, 
the truth-functional connectives, and the interactions between them. Indeed, 
bilattices even suggest other operations we might want to incorporate into a 
logic-programming language. In short, although a complete partial ordering (or a 
complete semilattice) is behind most proposed semantics, we believe the mathe- 
matical structure is actually richer than that in practice, and bilattices are the right 
abstract tools. Furthermore, we will see below that one of the nice “extras” that 
comes from the bilattice approach is that both the two- and the three-valued 
semantical theories follow easily from work on Belnap’s four-valued version 
(because two- and three-valued logics are natural sublogics of the four-valued 
logic). And this is not unique to the four-valued case; with no more work similar 
results can be established for bilattices in general, under certain simple additional 
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conditions. Finally, there are nice relationships between the two- and the three- 
valued approaches (for programs where both can be applied). The bilattice setting 
makes possible an algebraic formulation of this connection, and a considerable 
extension of it. Without the use of bilattices the very possibility of such a 
formulation is doubtful. We have hopes that results like Theorem 7.7 will help to 
shed more light on the role of negation in logic programming. 
In short, we believe bilattices are a very natural framework for the general 
consideration of logic programming semantics. We intend to justify this belief. 
2. THE FOUR-VALUED CASE 
We begin with the simplest example-the four-valued logic FOUR due to Belnap 
[3,22]. And we begin with a motivation for considering it. 
Suppose we have a fixed logic-programming language L, whose details need not 
concern us just now. We assume clause heads are atomic, and clause bodies can 
contain negations and also conjunctions and disjunctions, explicit or implicit. And 
say 9 is a program written in the’language L. But let us suppose 9 is distributed 
over a number of sites, with some provision for interaction. Some predicates might 
be local to a site, while others may be global. We issue a query to the network of 
sites. Each site attempts to answer the query by the usual mechanism of replacing 
one question with a list of others. Subsequent queries involving local predicates are 
handled locally, while those involving global predicates are broadcast o the system 
in the same way that my initial query was. Details of variable binding will not be 
gone into here-indeed, for our purposes we will identify a program with the set 
of ground instances of its clauses. But even with this simple model a fundamental 
problem arises: what do we do with conflicting responses? If we ask the system ?-q, 
a site having clauses covering q may respond with “yes,” while a site having no 
clauses for q will, via negation as failure, respond with “no.” How should we 
reconcile these? 
Several simple-minded solutions are possible, some of which take us beyond 
classical truth values. We could, for instance, insist on a consensus. Then, faced 
with conflicting answers, we could say we have no information. Or we could treat 
each site as an expert whose opinions we value, and so when faced with the 
problem of two answers, we accept them both, and simply record the existence of a 
conflict. 
Belnap’s four-valued logic, which we call FOUR, provides the right setting for 
this. One can think of his truth values as seb of ordinary truth values: (true}, which 
we will write as true; {false), which we will write as false; 0, which we will write as 
I and read as undefined, and {true, false), which we will’write as T and read as 
overdefined. 
Belnap noted that two natural partial orderings existed for these truth values. 
The subset relation is one; it can be thought of as an ordering reflecting informa- 
tion content. Thus {true, false) contains more information than {true} say. The 
other ordering expresses “degree of truth”; for example, 0 has a higher degree of 
truth than {false}, precisely because it does not contain false. Thus we might call a 
truth value t, less-true-or-more-false than t, if t, contains false but t2 doesn’t, or 
t, contains true but I, doesn’t. Both of these are natural orderings to consider. 
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FIGURE 1. The logic FOUR. 
Ginsberg had the insight to see there are intimate interconnections and to 
generalize them. Figure 1 is a double Hasse diagram displaying the two partial 
orderings of FOUR at once. The knowledge or information direction is vertical 
(labeled k), while the truth direction is horizontal (labeled t). Thus a sk b if there 
is an upward path from a to b, and a st b if there is a rightward path from a to b. 
Both partial orderings give us a complete lattice. In particular, meets and joins 
exist in each direction. We use the notation A and V for finite meet and join, A 
and V for arbitrary meet and join, in the I, ordering. And we use @ and @ for 
finite meet and join, n and C for arbitrary meet and join, in the sk ordering. 
Negation we define directly: --true = false; 7 false = true; 7 T = T ; 7 I = _L . 
Thinking of four-valued truth values as sets of ordinary truth values, this negation 
amounts to the application of ordinary negation to each member of the set. 
Kleene’s strong three-valued logic [16] and ordinary two-valued logic are pres- 
ent as sublattices. The operations of the st ordering and negation, when re- 
stricted to false and true, are the classical ones, and when restricted to false, true, 
and I are Kleene’s. Thus FOUR retains all the mathematical machinery of the 
two- and three-valued logics that have worked so well, and gives us complete 
lattices, thus simplifying the technical setting somewhat. 
Note that the operations induced by the sk ordering also have a natural 
interpretation. Combining truth values using @ amounts to the consensus ap- 
proach to conflicts mentioned above, while the use of @ corresponds to the 
accept-anything version. This suggests that counterparts of these operations should 
be part of a logic-programming language designed for distributed implementation. 
Now, the meaning assigned to a program 9 will be a model, but a four-valued 
one. As in classical logic, we need a domain D, but in logic programming this 
domain is generally thought of as fixed. In practice it is the Herbrand universe, or 
maybe the space of regular trees, or some such thing. The details need not concern 
us now. We assume ground terms of the language L name members of D, and 
every member of D has a unique such name, so we can just identify D with the set 
BILATTICES AND LOGIC PROGRAMMING 95 
of ground terms. (A more general treatment allowing arbitrary domains is easily 
possible.) With this understood, we generally suppress mention of D for now. All 
that is left is to characterize valuations. 
Definition 2.1. A valuation v in FOUR is a mapping from the set of ground atomic 
formulas of L to FOUR. Valuations are given two pointwise orderings as 
follows: ~1, sk u2 if u,(A) sk u,(A) for every ground atomic formula A; U, I, v2 
if c,(A) I, c,(A) for every ground atomic formula A. 
The set of valuations constitutes a complete lattice under each of the induced 
orderings sk and 5, , and inherits much of the structure of FOUR in a natural 
way. Valuations can be extended to maps from the set of all ground formulas to 
FOUR in the following way. Here we assume formulas are built up from the atomic 
level using 7, A, V, maybe V,3, and maybe operation symbols @., @, n, and C. 
Definition 2.2. A valuation L’ determines a unique map, also denoted v, on the set 
of all ground formulas, according to the following conditions: 
(2) v(Xo Y> = v(X)0 v(Y) for 0 one of A, V, a, or @, 
(3) v(W’x>P(x>) = Ad E .v(P(O, 
(4) v(Clx)P(x)) = v, E Dv(P(d)), 
(5) v(mx>P(x)> = n,,.vuw), 
(6) ~‘((Cx)f’(x)) = Cd t +0’(d)). 
Now the idea of a fixed-point semantics can be given an intuitively appealing 
presentation. We want to associate with a program 9 an operator Q,, that maps 
valuations to valuations. It should calculate values for clause bodies in 9 accord- 
ing to the definition above. In particular, the classic truth-functional operations 
have their meaning supplied by the 5, ordering. And we want to find the least 
fixed point of @,@, but least in the sk direction: the fixed point containing no 
extraneous information. In order to do this we need to know that the various 
operations interact well with the jk ordering, so that a least fixed point is 
guaranteed to exist. For example, the behavior of the operation A, defined using 
5, , must mesh somehow with the properties of sk so that monotonicity of the 
operator @,+ is ensured. 
In fact, this always happens. Moreover, what happens relates well to, and 
generalizes, the two- and three-valued approaches already in the literature. The 
four-valued setting is explored further in [ll], and with certain restrictions placed 
on the language, it is shown to provide a natural and usable extension of 
conventional logic programming. An implementation on top of Prolog has been 
developed, and the result is a language that behaves well when negations and free 
variables are both allowed to occur in queries. But, rather than proceeding further 
with this four-valued example here, we move to the broader setting of bilattices, 
establish our results in greater generality, and apply them to FOUR and other 
particular cases later on. 
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3. BILA’ITICES 
M. Ginsberg [14,15] has proposed bilattices as an elegant generalization of FOUR. 
We need a somewhat more restricted notion, which we call an interlaced bilattice. 
The Ginsberg references should be consulted for the underlying bilattice definition 
and examples. 
Definition 3.1. An interlaced biluttice is a set B together with two partial orderings 
sk and I, such that: 
(1) each of sk and I, gives B the structure of a complete lattice; 
(2) the meet and join operations for each partial ordering are monotone with 
respect to the other ordering. 
We call condition (2) the interlacing condition. We use notational conventions 
similar to those of the previous section, with an arbitrary interlaced bilattice. A 
and v are finite meet and join under the I, ordering; A and V are arbitrary 
meet and join under I, . @ and @ are finite meet and join under sk ; ll and L 
are arbitrary meet and join under sk . false and true are least and greatest 
elements under I, ; I and T are least and greatest elements under sk . 
If a I, b and c I, d then a A c & b A d, because this is a basic property of 
meets in a lattice. But condition (2) of Definition 3.1 requires also that a sk b and 
c sk d imply a A c sk b A d. Similarly for other operation/ordering combinations. 
Condition (2) expresses the fundamental interconnection that makes an interlaced 
bilattice more than just two independent lattices stuck together. It requires some 
care in interpretation when infinitary operations are involved. We take its meaning 
in such cases as follows. Suppose A and B are subsets of B. We write A I, B if 
for each a EA there is some b E B with a I, b, and for each b E B there is some 
a EA with a I, b. Then condition (2) is taken to require that if A sr B then 
nA I, II B. And of course similarly for other operator/ordering combinations. 
FOUR is an example of an interlaced bilattice. This can be checked directly; 
also it follows from more general results later on. We tacitly assume all interlaced 
bilattices are nontrivial. FOUR, then, is the simplest example, and is isomorphi- 
tally a sub-bilattice of all other bilattices. On the other hand, there are bilattices as 
defined in [14] and [15] that are not interlaced. Figure 2 displays a bilattice for a 
default logic. In it, df is intended to represent a value of default falsehood, while 
dt represents default truth. This does not satisfy the interlacing condition, though. 
For instance, false I, df but fake 8 * = * and df @ * = df, so false 8 * I, 
df @ * fails. 
Proposition 3.1. In any interlaced bilattice, 
(1) true @false = T ; true 69 false = I ; 
(2) T V I =tme; T A -L =fahe. 
PROOF. It is easy to see that a @ T = T for all a. Also, since false is the smallest 
element under I, , false I, T , so since we have an interlaced bilattice, a @ 
false I, a @ T . Taking a to be true, we have true @false I, true @ T = T . In the 
other direction, T I, true; hence a 8 T I, a @ true for any a. Then T = false @ 
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FIGURE 2. A bilattice for a default logic. 
T st f&e @ true. These two inequalities establish that false 63 true = T . The rest 
of the cases are established in a similar way. q 
Notice that negation is not part of the basic interlaced bilattice structure. Still, a 
negation notion generally exists in cases we are interested in. We merely require 
that it mesh well with the orderings. 
Definition 3.2. An interlaced bilattice B has a weak negation operation if there is a 
mapping 7 : B -+ B such that: 
(1) U&b * -a<,+ 7b; 
(2) a --<t b - 7 b --<, ~a. 
NOTE. In bilattices as defined in [14] and i1.51, the existence of a negation 
operation is basic, and, in addition to the conditions above, one must also have 
that a = 7 7 u. Since we have postulated the rather powerful interlacing condi- 
tions here, we do not need the full strength of negation; generally the existence of 
a weak negation is sufficient. If the additional double negation condition is 
satisfied, we will say we have a negation operation rather than a weak negation 
operation. 
The intuition here is straightforward. Negations should reverse truth; one 
expects that. But negations do not change knowledge; one knows as much about 
7 a as one knows about a. Hence a negation operation reverses the I, ordering 
but preserves the sk ordering. 
There is one more basic operation on interlaced bilattices that we want to 
consider, though its familiarity is considerably less than that of negation. In FOUR, 
some of the truth values were essentially classical, while others made up a natural 
three-valued logic. What we need is some mechanism for distinguishing those parts 
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of an interlaced bilattice that constitute natural sublogics, and that is what this 
extra operation is for (more will be said about intuitive motivation in the next 
section). We call it co@ztion. The basic ideas, though not the name, come from 
[22]. The intention is, conflation is like negation, but with the roles of sk and I, 
switched around. In particular, in FOUR, negation “flips” the diagram in Figure 1 
from left to right. We take conflation in FOUR to be the operation that “flips” the 
diagram from top to bottom, interchanging T and I , and leaving false and true 
alone. It is easy to check that this is a conflation operation, according to the 
following definition. 
Definition 3.3. An interlaced bilattice B has a conflution operation if there is a 
mapping - : B + B such that: 
(1) a I, b d -a I, -b; 
(2) u<,b * -b<,-a; 
(3) - -a =a. 
We said the space of valuations in FOUR “inherited” much of the structure of 
FOUR. Now we can be more precise about what this means. 
Definition 3.4. Suppose B is an interlaced bilattice and S is a set. Let BS be the set 
of all mappings from S to B, with induced orderings --<k and I, defined 
pointwise on BS. That is, for f, g E BS, f Sk g provided f(s) sk g(s) for all 
s E S, and similarly for sr . If B has a weak negation operation, this induces a 
corresponding operation on BS according to (7 f Xs> = 7 f(s). Similarly for a 
conflation operation. 
Proposition 3.2. Suppose B is an interlaced bilattice and S is a set. Then BS is also an 
interlaced biluttice. The operations in BS are the pointwise ones: (f 8 g)(s) = f(s) 
8 g(s), and so on. In addition, if B is an interlaced biluttice with weak negation, 
so is BS, and similarly for conflation. 
PROOF. A straightforward matter of checking, which we omit. q 
We use the obvious extension of notation from elements of an interlaced 
bilattice to subsets: TA={TalaEA}and -A={-a)aEA). 
Proposition 3.3. In an interlaced biluttice with conflation, 
(1) -AA= A -A; -(ar\b>=(-a/\ -6); 
(2) -VA= V -A; -(uvb)=(-av -b); 
(3) -nA=C--A; -(u@bb>=(-a@ -6); 
(4) -CA=n-A; -(u@b>=(-a@ -b). 
PROOF. We demonstrate part (1); the other parts are similar. If a is an arbitrary 
member of A, then A A I, a, so - A A sr - a. It follows that - A A I, A -A. 
Conversely, for an arbitrary a E A, -a E -A, and so A -A I, - a. It follows that 
- A -A I, a, and so - A -A I, A A, and hence A -A I, - A A. q 
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Definition 3.5. If B is an interlaced bilattice with weak negation and conflation, we 
say conflation commutes with negation provided - 7 a = 7 - a for all a. 
In FOUR conflation commutes with negation. The notion of commuting extends 
in an obvious way to binary (and infinitary) operations. Then Proposition 3.3 says 
conflation commutes with A, A, V, and V . 
Proposition 3.4. In any interlaced bilattice with conflation, 
(1) --I=T; -T=l’ 
(2) -false = false; - trul: = true. 
PROOF. Since I sk a for any a, we have I sk - T , and so T sk - I. It 
follows from the definition of T that T = - I . Then easily, - T = I . 
Since false sr a for any a, it follows from the definition of V that false V a = a 
for any a. Using this we have -false = -false V false = -false V - -false = 
- (false V -false) = - ( -false) = false. Similarly for -true = true. Cl 
The interlaced bilattices of most interest to us in this paper all have a conflation 
operation and usually a negation operation. These operations cannot be taken for 
granted, though. In [lo] we considered a family of interlaced bilattices with 
conflation and a weak negation operation that satisfied the condition a I, 7 7 a 
though not generally a = 7 7 a. Thus the weak negation operation there had an 
intuitionistic flavor. The interlaced bilattice displayed in Figure 3 does not have a 
conflation operation. It has a weak negation operation, but one that does not even 
meet the intuitionistic condition stated above. (In the diagram of Figure 3, false 
and b are incomparable under I, , while b and I are incomparable under I, . 
Similarly for other horizontal or vertical edges.) 
k 
/ 
t 
FIGURE 3. The interlaced bilattice SIX. 
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The diagram in Figure 3 does represent an interlaced bilattice, SIX-we will 
verify this in Section 4. Checking that there is no conflation operation is simple. If 
there were one, its behavior on T , I , false, and true would be determined by 
Proposition 3.4, so only -a and -b need to be specified. If -a = T then 
a = - -a = - T = I , which is not the case. Similarly all of T , I , true, and 
false are ruled out as possible values for -a and -b, so we are forced to have 
either -a=a or -a = b. Both of these are impossible. For instance, since 
a sk false, then -false sk - a. If we had -a = a, then this would say false sk a, 
which is not the case. -a = b can be ruled out in a similar way. Likewise one can 
check that there is no negation. There is a weak negation operation, though. Take 
Tb=T, la=I, Tfalse=true, Ttrue=false, 7 T=T, and 1 I=I. It is 
easy to verify that this is a weak negation operation, but since 7 7 b = T , we do 
not have b sr 7 -I b. 
Now we take up the issue of possible sublogics of an interlaced bilattice that 
may be of use and interest. 
Definition 3.6. In an interlaced bilattice B with conflation, for a E B, 
(1) a is exact if a = -a; 
(2) a is consistent if a Sk - a. 
We remark that [22] used other terminology for these notions, but the defini- 
tions are essentially from that paper. In FOUR the exact truth values are the 
classical ones, false and true, and the consistent ones are (of course> these and also 
I . In other words, we get the classical values and Kleene’s values as exact and 
consistent. Now, the classical values are closed under the I, based operations in 
FOUR, and similarly for the truth values of Kleene’s logic. Likewise Kleene’s 
values yield a complete semilattice under sk , a point which played a significant 
role in [7]. Features like these are, in fact, quite general. 
Proposition 3.5. Let B be an interlaced bilattice with conflation. The exact members 
include false and true and are closed under A, A, v , and V . Zf B has a weak 
negation which commutes with the conflation operation, then the exact members 
are closed under negation as well. The exact members do not include I or T and 
are not closed under Q or @. 
PROOF. false and true are exact by Proposition 3.4. If a , and b are exact, by 
Proposition 3.3 -(a A b) = -a A - b = a A b; hence there is closure under A. 
Similarly for the other cases. Neither I nor T is exact, by Proposition 3.4 (and 
the fact that I # T ). The exact members are not closed under 8, because then 
true @false = I would be exact. Similarly for @. 0 
Definition 3.7. A complete semilattice is a partially ordered set that is closed under 
arbitrary meets, and under joins of directed subsets. A subset D is directed if 
for all X, y E D, there is an z E D such that x 5 z and y 5 z. 
Proposition 3.6. Let B be an interlaced bilattice with conflation. The consistent 
members include the exact members and I , and are closed under A, A, V , V . 
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Zf B has a weak negation that commutes with conflation, the consistent members 
are closed under negation as well. Finally the consistent members constitute a 
complete semilattice under sk , being closed under l7 and under directed C. 
PROOF. Exactness trivially implies consistency. If S is a set of consistent members, 
it follows that S I, - S, so A S sk r\ - S = - A S, hence the consistent members 
are closed under A. The other truth-functional closures are similar. 
Again, let S be a set of consistent members, so S sk - S. Then HS sk Ll - S = 
-CS. Also IIS sk ES, so -CS $ - nS. It follows that IJS & - nS, so LIS is 
consistent. Thus we have closure under I-l. 
Finally, suppose S is a set of consistent members that also is directed by sk . 
To show CS is consistent we must show CS sk - LS = Il -S. For this, it is 
enough to show that for any a, b E S, a I, - b. But, since S is directed and 
a, b ES, there is some c ES with a q c and b sk c. Then -c sk -b; c is 
consistent, so c sk - c; and hence a sk - b. 0 
NOTE. Many of these arguments, including that for being a semilattice, come 
from [22]. 
4. EXAMPLES 
The basic bilattice construction is due to Ginsberg, and is easily described. 
Suppose C = (C, I ) and D = (D, I ) are complete lattices. (We use the same 
notation, I , for both orderings, since context can determine which is meant.) 
Form the set of points C x D, and give it two orderings, sk and st , as follows: 
(c,,d,) Sk (c,,d,) if c, IC, and d, Ed,. 
(c,,d,) I, (c,,d,) if c,<c, and d,<d,. 
We denote the resulting structure (C X D, Sk , I, > by 3?(C, D). 
Proposition 4.1. For complete lattices C and D, B(C, D) is an interlaced bilattice. 
PROOF. Straightforward. It is easy to check that, if we use n and LI for meet and 
join in both of C and D, then 
(cl, d,) @ (cz, dz) = (cl n c2, d, n d2), 
(c,,d,) @ (c,,d,) = (cl uc,,d, ud,), 
(cr,d,) A (c,,d,) = (cl nc,,d, udZ), 
(cl,&) v (c,,d,) = (cl uc,,d, n&j, 
and similarly for the infinitary cases. q 
The intuition here is illuminating. Suppose we think of a pair (c, d) in &%C, D) 
as representing two independent judgements concerning the truth of some state- 
ment: c represents our degree of belief for the statement; d represents our degree 
of belief against it. These may, for instance, have been arrived at by asking 
independent experts. And since C and D can be different lattices, expressions of 
belief for and against need not be measured in the same way. Now, if (c,, d,) sk 
(c,,d,), then (c,,d,) embodies more “knowledge” than (c,, d,), which is re- 
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fleeted by an increased degree of belief both for and against; perhaps more 
information has been received which has increased the certainty of our “experts”. 
On the other hand, if (c,,d,) st (cZ,d2), then (c,,d,) embodies more “truth” 
than (ci, d,), which is reflected by an increased degree of belief for, and a 
decreased degree of belief against. 
The simplest particular example begins with the simplest nontrivial lattice [Z”]: 
{false, true} with false 5 true. &?(TR, TR) is simply an isomorphic copy of FOUR 
(Figure 1). In this representation, I is (false, false), no belief for and no belief 
against; similarly, T is (true, true). Likewise false is (false, true), no belief for, 
total belief against; and true is (true, false >. 
Another example of importance is a quantitative one, based on the complete 
lattice [0, 11 with the usual ordering I of reals. This lattice was used as a space of 
truth values by van Emden [201. .H[O, 11, [O, 11) . 1s an interlaced bilattice that bears 
the same relation to van Emden’s system that FOUR bears to classical logic: it 
accommodates conflicting quantitative information smoothly. 
Kripke models for modal logics provide another family of examples. As 
Ginsberg suggests, we can think of the set of possible worlds in which a formula is 
true as the evidence for a formula; similarly for false and evidence against. Then, 
given a particular Kripke model with Y as the set of possible worlds, use the 
power-set lattice P = (P(Y), c ) to create the interlaced bilattice @P, P). This is 
a natural sort of evidence space. 
A different family of interlaced bilattices was considered in [lo], based on 
topological spaces arising out of Kripke intuitionistic-logic models. Let 7 be a 
topological space. The family B of open sets is a complete lattice under c. Join is 
union, while meet is interior of intersection. Likewise the family 8 of closed sets is 
a complete lattice under c. In [lo] we investigated interlaced bilattices of the 
form 988, 8). 
Finally, suppose C is the lattice (0, 1) with 0 5 1, and D is the lattice {0,1,2] 
with 0 5 1 5 2. Then @(C, D), shown in Figure 4, is isomorphic to the interlaced 
bilattice SIX, given in Figure 3, which incidentally verifies that SIX is an interlaced 
bilattice. 
If the two lattices being combined to create an interlaced bilattice are the same, 
then a negation is easy to define. 
Lkfinition 4.1. In @CC, C), let 7 (a, b) = (b, a>, 
The intuition, once again, is appealing. In passing from (a, 6) to 7 (a, b > we 
are reversing evidence roles, counting for what was counted against, and con- 
versely. Of course, doing this presupposes that evidence for and against is mea- 
sured the same way; hence the need for a single underlying lattice. This also 
suggests why the interlaced bilattice SIX, in Figure 3, was plausible as a candidate 
for one without a negation. The verification that the operation defined above is a 
negation is simple, and is omitted. 
The definition of negation does not apply to the family of interlaced bilattices 
based on open and closed sets of a topological space, since it presupposes that only 
one lattice is involved, rather than two different ones. But for such an interlaced 
bilattice, we can take 7 (0, C), w h ere 0 is an open set and C is a closed set, to be 
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FIGURE 4. The interlaced bilattice &%C, D). 
(interior(C), closure(O)). In general this gives a weak negation satisfying the 
condition a I, 7 7 a, though not the full negation condition. 
For a conflation, additional lattice machinery is necessary. 
Definition 4.2. We say a lattice has an involution if there is a one-to-one mapping, 
denoted -, such that a 5 b implies -b I -a. 
For example, in TR = {false, true), classical negation is an involution. In IO, 11 
the map taking x to 1 -x is an involution. In a power-set lattice P = (P(Y), c >, 
based on a Kripke model say, complementation is an involution. 
Proposition 4.2. If C is a complete lattice with an involution, then -(a, b) = 
( - b, - a) is a conflation in &?(C, C> that commutes with negation defined as 
above. 
PROOF. Straightforward. q 
Once again, there is a loose intuition at work here. In passing from (a, b) to 
- (a, b) = ( - b, - a) we are moving to “default” evidence. We are now counting 
for whatever was not counted against before, and against what was not counted 
for. Now our definitions of consistent and exact can be given further motivation. In 
@([O, 11, [0, 11) for instance, a truth value (x, y > is consistent if x + y I 1 and exact 
if x +y = 1. Likewise, in .@(P, P> where P is (P(Y), & >, (x, y) is consistent if 
x ny = 0, and exact if x and y are complementary. Generally the idea is that 
consistency means there is no conflict between our beliefs for and against; 
exactness means these beliefs cover all cases. 
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Conflations based on involutions only make sense when a single underlying 
lattice is involved, and so this does not apply to the topological examples. But a 
conflation can be defined there as well. Take - (0, C), where 0 is open and C is -- 
closed, to be (C, O), where the overbar denotes complement. This also gives a 
conflation that commutes with negation, as defined above. Clearly this example can 
be generalized, to cases where order reversing mappings exist between two lattices 
-we do not do this here. 
There are also examples of interesting and useful operations that make sense 
only for very special interlaced bilattices. A good instance involves the interlaced 
bilattice &?([O, 11, [0, 11). For each real r E [0, 11, let V, be the scalar multiplication 
operation: V,((a, b)) = ( ru, rb). In @([O, l],[O, l]), V, is monotone with respect to 
both the sk and the I, orderings and commutes with negation but not with 
conflation. V, finds a natural use in the logic-programming setting later on. 
5. LOGIC-PROGRAMMING SYNTAX 
Logic programming is generally thought of as being relative to the Herbrand 
universe, with the space (false, true} of truth values. Both restrictions are unneces- 
sary, and rather narrow. In this section we set up the syntax for a logic-program- 
ming language relative to an arbitrary data structure, not just the Herbrand 
universe. We also introduce syntactical machinery to deal with distributed pro- 
grams. In the next section we turn to semantical issues. 
Definition 5.1. A data structure is a tuple (D; R,, . . . , R,) where D is a nonempty 
set, called the domain, and R,, . . . , R, are relations on D, called given relations. 
A work space W consists of a data structure (D; R,, . . . , R,) and a permanent 
association of relation symbols R,, . . . , R, with each of the given relations 
R i, . . . , R,. The relation symbols R,, . . . , R, are reserved relation symbols. 
One example of a work space in common use in many PROLOGs is that of 
arithmetic: the domain is the integers, the given relations are the (three-place) 
addition and multiplication relations, and these are associated with the relation 
symbols plus and times. Another example is strings: the domain is all words over a 
finite alphabet; the concatenation relation is given. The usual Herbrand universe 
can be made into a work space: take the Herbrand universe as the domain, and for 
each n-place function symbol f, take a given n + l-place relation Rf where 
RJxi,..., x,, y) =y is the term f(n,, . . . , x,). In a similar way one can make the 
rational trees into a work space. Examples like these are considered more fully in 
191. 
Data structures are really semantic objects, but we need to know a little about 
them now, in order to specify syntax. Let Y be a work space with data structure 
(DR,,..., R,) and reserved relation symbols R,, . , . , R,. F is fixed for the rest 
of this section. We want to specify a iogic-programming language L(Y) that 
“uses” X 
To begin, L(W) needs constants, to refer to members of D. If D were, say, the 
integers, L(Y) would have some notion of numeral so that particular integers 
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could be referenced. Since this sort of issue is not central to our present concerns, 
we simply assume members of D themselves are allowed as constants in L(39. 
Definition 5.2. The terms of L(P) are constants (members of D) and variables 
(x,,x,, . . . >. We generally use X, y, . . . to stand for variables. 
We also assume we have an unlimited supply of relation symbols of all arities. 
Definition 5.3. An atomic formula of L(T) is an expression P(t,, . . . , tk) where P 
is a k-place relation symbol and t 1,. . . , t, are terms of L(Y). If the terms are 
members of D, the atomic formula is ground. If P is reserved in 7, we refer to 
P(t,, . . .) t,) as reserved too. 
Logic programs are generally written with implicit quantifiers and connectives. 
But by applying techniques like those of Clark’s completion [6], many clauses for a 
given relation symbol can be collapsed into a single “clause.” For example, 
consider the (conventional) logic program 
P(f(xN -A(x), B(x, Y>. 
f%(x)) + C(x). 
This converts to 
P(z) + (34(3Y)(Rf( x,2> AA(X) W&Y)) v (3x)(R,(x,z) AC(x)). 
It will be simplest for us to assume that all program clauses are already in such a 
form, and that only a single clause for each relation symbol is present in any 
program. Further, by making use of explicit quantifiers, we can assume without loss 
of generality that all variables present in a clause body must occur in the head. 
Finally, we do not allow reserved relation symbols to appear in clause heads. These 
represent given relations, not relations we are computing. 
Definition 5.4. 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
A simple formula is any formula built up from atomic formulas in the usual 
way using A, V, -,, V, and 3. 
A simple clause is an expression P(x,, . . . , x,) + 4(x,, . . . , x,1 where xi, 
. . . , xk are variables, P(x,, . . . , xk) is unreserved atomic, and 4(x,, . . . , xk) 
is a simple formula whose free variables are among xi, . . . , xk. The atomic 
formula to the left of the arrow is the clause head, and the formula to the 
right is the clause body. 
A simple program is a finite set of simple clauses with no relation symbol 
appearing in more than one clause head. 
NOTE. We call a formula positive if it does not contain 7. We call a simple 
program positive if its clause bodies are positive. We use the same terminology 
with other kinds of programs, defined below. 
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Next we turn to programs distributed over a number of sites. Say we have a 
finite, fixed collection of sites S, labeled 1,2,. . . , s. Each site will have its own 
program clauses. We assume that each site can ask other sites for information. To 
keep the syntactic machinery uncluttered, we merely subscript relation symbols to 
indicate what site should be asked. Thus P&a, g(b)) will be taken to mean that site 
3 should be asked to establish that P(a, g(b)). Since the number of sites is finite 
and fixed, things like “does anybody know” can be turned into “does 1 know; does 
2 know; . . . ; does s know.” Thus what we need is versatile machinery for combin- 
ing possibly conflicting answers from various sites. Syntactically we add operations 
@ and @. When we come to semantics in the next section, these will correspond 
to “knowledge direction” bilattice operations, as we have seen in previous sec- 
tions. 
Definition 5.5. 
(1) An S atomic formula is an atomic formula of the form Pi(t,, . . . , tk) where P 
is an unreserved relation symbol and i E S; also R(t,, . . . , t,) is an S atomic 
formula if R is an (unsubscripted) reserved relation symbol. An S formula is 
a formula built up from S atomic formulas using A, V, 7, V, 3, @I, and CB .
(2) A local clause is an expression of the form P(x,, . . ., x,) + 4(x,, . . . , xk) 
where P(x,, . . . , x,) is unreserved atomic, and 4(x,, . . . , x,) is an S formula 
whose free variables are among x,, . . . , xk. 
(3) A local program is a finite set of local clauses with no relation symbol 
appearing in the head of more than one local clause. 
(4) A distributed program is a set {.9,, 9,, . . . , P,} of local programs. 
Thus we think of 9, as the program clauses “at” site 1, LFz “at” site 2, and so 
on. Thinking of a program as being distributed over multiple sites, with communi- 
cation by query and response, is suggestive. But we do not intend, here, to consider 
computational or implementation issues, only semantic ones. And for semantic 
purposes we only need to record which sites have which clauses-communication 
mechanisms can be ignored. Thus it is convenient to convert a distributed program 
into a single entity, which we do as follows. Suppose (9,, 9,, . . . , Ys} is a 
distributed program. Rewrite each clause in Pi by attaching the subscript i to the 
relation symbol occurring in the clause head (recall, unreserved relation symbols in 
clause bodies already have subscripts attached, since clause bodies are S formulas). 
Then let 9 be the set of all rewritten clauses coming from Pi, 9,, . . . , Ps. We 
say 9 is the compound program corresponding to the distributed program 
IS,,@,,. . . , a. 
A compound program, then, is a single set of clauses, and differs from a simple 
program by the presence of subscripts (inessential) and by the use of CZJ and CB 
(essential). Semantically we can think of subscripted relation symbols as just 
different relation symbols, and ignore explicit subscripts from now on. Then simple 
programs become special cases of compound programs; compound programs differ 
from simple ones by allowing CQ and 6~. (We could also allow II and C; it does not 
affect the semantics, but we do not know of a use for them.) It is the semantics of 
comDound programs that we take up in the next section. 
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6. LOGIC-PROGRAMMING SEMANTICS 
For this section, program means compound program, as characterized in the 
previous section. Let (D;R,, . . . ,R,) be a data structure, fixed for this section, 
with a work space W based on it that assigns the reserved relation symbol Ri to 
the given relation R,. We use a logic-programming language L(Y), relative to this 
work space, as defined in the previous section. Also let B be an interlaced bilattice, 
fixed for the section. 
Definition 6.1. An interpretation is a mapping L’ from ground atomic formulas to B. 
The interpretation is in the work space 79’ provided, for each given relation Ri, 
if R,(d,, . . . , dk) is true then u(RJd,, . . ., d,)) = true and if R,(d,, . . . , d,) is not 
true then v(R,(d,, . . , d,)) = false. 
NOTE. true and false, in the definition above, refer to the least and greatest 
elements of B in the I, ordering. As defined, given relations are classical; hence 
interpretations in a work space assign to atomic formulas involving reserved 
relation symbols only “classical” truth values. This restriction can be relaxed for 
many of the results below, and so a more general notion of work space can be 
used, for instance allowing “partial” relations as in [12] and [13]. We keep to 
classical values now for given relations for simplicity of presentation. 
Definition 6.2. The orderings I, and sk are extended to interpretations point- 
wise. That is, ci sr c’~ p rovided, for each closed atomic formula A, v,(A) I, 
u,(A), and similarly for --<k .
Given a closed formula 4 and an interpretation U, a “truth value” ~(4) in B is 
determined in the obvious way, by associating the operation symbol A with the 
bilattice operation A, V with A, and so on. We assume that negations are allowed 
in 4 only in cases where B has a weak negation operation. The pointwise ordering, 
though defined using ground atomic formulas, extends to arbitrary closed for- 
mulas. 
Proposition 6.1. Let 4 be a closed formula, and let v1 and v2 be interpretations. 
(1) vi Sk v2 implies ~,(c#J) Sk ~~($1; 
(2) v1 I, v2 implies v~(#J) I, ~~(4) provided 4 is positive. 
PROOF. Immediate from the definitions of interlaced bilattice and negation. q 
We are about to associate an operator with each program. Before we do, we 
must decide what action to take for atomic formulas that do not match the head of 
any clause of a program. The two obvious possibilities are: assign such formulas 
the value I ; assign the value false. It is technically convenient, as well as being 
consistent with negation as failure, to use the value false in such cases. 
DeJnition 6.3. Let 9 be a compound program in the work space %? Then Q9 is 
the mapping from interpretations to interpretations such that, for an interpreta- 
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tion v: 
(1) for a reserved relation symbol Ri, Ca,(cXR,(d,, . . . , d,)) = true if Ri(d,, 
. . . , d,) is true, and Q9(vXRi(d,, . . . , d,)) = false if R,(d,, . . . , d,) is false; 
(2) for an unreserved relation symbol Q, if there is a clause in 9 of the form 
Qcx,,..., xk) + 4(x,, . . . , x,), then @p(vXQ(d,, . . . , d,)) = 
u(&i,, *. . , d/J; 
(3) for an unreserved relation symbol Q, if there is no clause in 9 of the form 
Q(x ,,“‘, x/J +- $4x,, . . . , xk), then +JuXQ(d,, . . . , d,)) = false. 
It is in part (2) that we use our assumption that all variables occurring in a 
clause body also occur in the head. Part (1) says that Q,(v) will be an interpreta- 
tion in the given work space. What is more, it is immediate from Proposition 6.1 
that monotonicity extends to operators generally. 
Proposition 4.2. Let 9 be a compound program 
(1) If VI Sk u2 then @,(u,) Sk @&,>, 
(2) rf u1 I, u2 then @,(u,) I, Q9(u2) provided 9 ispositive. 
The family of interpretations is a complete lattice under both the I, and the 
sk orderings. By the Knaster-Tarski theorem [193, least and greatest fixed points 
exist in a complete lattice for any monotone mapping. We suggest hat a natural 
semantical meaning for a compound program 9 is the least fixed point of @g 
under the sk ordering. It is a program model that interprets the various 
operations reasonably, and contains the least information consistent with the 
program 9. 
Proposition 6.2 continues to hold, of course, if other operation symbols are 
allowed in clause bodies, provided they are interpreted by monotone operations. 
For instance, in Section 4 we introduced a family of scalar multiplication operators 
V,, in the interlaced bilattice @([O, 11, [O, l]), and we observed that they were 
monotone with respect to each ordering. Thus operator symbols for them could be 
introduced into clause bodies when G?([O, 11, [O, 11) is being used as the space of 
truth values, and all appropriate fixed points would still exist. Application of V, 
amounts to a proportional diminuation of the degree of certainty. Van Emden 
built counterparts of these operators into his logic-programming system [20]. They 
cause no complication in the present interlaced-bilattice setting. 
7. CONNECTIONS 
When programs are restricted in various ways, more can be said about the 
extremal fixed points. The next few propositions consider this. For the rest of this 
section, the semantics is with respect to an interlaced bilattice B. Some of the 
results use the notions of exact or consistent, and hence require a conflation 
operation. If a weak negation operation is present, we always assume it commutes 
with conflation if there is a conflation operation. 
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Definition 7.1. Assuming B has a conflation operation, an interpretation u is 
consistent (or exact) if, for each ground atomic formula A, v(A) is consistent 
(or exact). 
NOTE. This is equivalent to saying u is consistent (or exact) in the interlaced 
bilattice of interpretations, using the induced conflation operation of Proposi- 
tion 3.2. 
Proposition 7.1. Suppose 9 is a simple program, and B has a conflation operation. 
Then the least fixed point of O9 under the sk ordering is consistent. 
PROOF. One “approximates” to the least fixed point of a monotone operator in a 
complete lattice through a transfinite sequence of steps. We show by transfinite 
induction that every member of such an approximation sequence is consistent; it 
follows that the limit (which must be attained at some ordinal) is also consistent. 
The initial term in the approximation sequence is the smallest member of the 
complete lattice. In our case, the smallest interpretation under the sk ordering is 
the one that gives ground atomic formulas the value I . Such an interpretation is 
consistent. 
Next, having defined the ath term of the approximation sequence, the LY + 1st 
results from it by applying the operator Q9. But Proposition 3.6 says the family of 
consistent truth values is closed under the operations allowed in the body of a 
simple program. Also the given relations have consistent (indeed exact) truth 
values. It follows that Q9, applied to a consistent interpretation, yields another 
consistent interpretation. Thus if the ath term of the approximation sequence is 
consistent, so is the (Y + 1st. 
Finally, at a limit ordinal A one takes the sup of interpretations associated with 
smaller ordinals (a collection which constitutes a chain). But again, Proposition 3.6 
says we have closure of consistent truth values under directed C. Then, if every 
member of the approximation sequence up to A is consistent, it follows that the 
Ath member also is consistent. This completes the transfinite-induction proof. q 
In the simplest case, where the interlaced bilattice is FOUR, this proposition 
says the least fixed point in the sk ordering, for a simple program, must actually 
be an interpretation in Kleene’s strong three-valued logic. It is not hard to check 
that it is the same as the least fixed point assigned by the three-valued semantics 
discussed in [7]. Indeed, the three-valued operator denoted @ in [7] coincides with 
the four-valued bilattice operator, when restricted to consistent truth values. In 
other words, the three-valued semantical approach is subsumed by the present, 
more general one. Indeed, the bilattice approach provides nicely suggestive termi- 
nology and motivation for the three-valued semantics. The operations used are 
truth-functional, being based on the I, ordering. But the least fixed point is 
evaluated in the --<k ordering, minimizing knowledge rather than truth. It is this 
shift from truth to knowledge that makes a smooth treatment of negation possible. 
Proposition 7.2, Suppose 9 is a simple, positive program, and B has a conflation 
operation. Then the least and the greatest fixed points of Q9 under the sr 
ordering are exact. 
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PROOF. The argument for the least fixed point is essentially the same as in the 
preceding proof, except that Proposition 3.5 must be used instead of Proposition 
3.6. Also the initial term of the approximation sequence must be smallest in the st 
ordering now, so it should assign to ground atomic formulas the value false instead 
of _L . The argument for the greatest fixed point is similar, except that one 
constructs the approximation sequence down from the top instead of up from the 
bottom, beginning with the biggest interpretation, which assigns to ground atomic 
formulas the value true, and at limit ordinals one takes infs, A, instead of sups. 
Again in the simplest case, using the interlaced bilattice FOUR, the proposition 
above says the least fixed point and the greatest fIxed point, under the st 
ordering, must be classical two-valued interpretations. In fact, for a simple, positive 
program 9, these are the least and greatest fixed points of the well-known T9 
operator, from [l]. So the classical semantics developed for positive programs is 
also a special case under the bilattice approach. The bilattice FOUR is also 
considered in [5], though in a somewhat more restricted way, with emphasis 
entirely on the st operations. That paper considers the issues of model, continu- 
’ ity, and operational semantics, none of which we take up here. 
For positive programs, both & and st least and greatest tixed points exist. 
Some easy results are obtained concerning their interrelationships. We use the 
following handy notation: U, and V, are the least and greatest fixed points of @,@ 
under the I, ordering, and uk is the least fixed point under the sk ordering. The 
following inequalities are immediate, by definition of least and greatest: 
(1) u, St uk 5, v,; 
(2) Vk Sk “(; 
(3) uk <k v,. 
Proposition 7.3. Let 9 be a simple, positive program, and let A be ground atomic. 
Also assume B has a conflation operation, v,(A) is exact iff v,(A) = V,(A) iff 
v,(A) = I/,(A) = v,(A). 
PROOF. By (11, if v,(A) = V,(A), then v,(A) = V,(A) = v,(A). It then follows that 
v,(A) is exact, by Proposition 7.2. 
By (2), v,(A) sk v,(A). Then -U,(A) 5, - ck( A). a,( A) is exact, by Proposition 
7.2, so if v,(A) is exact too, then c,(A) Sk v,(A), and hence v,(A) = v,(A). 
Similarly, if v,(A) is exact, V,(A) = v,(A). 0 
Corollary 7.4. For a simple, positive program 9, assuming there is a conflation, vk 
is exact iff v, = V, iff v, = V, = vk. 
Finally, for the classical truth values, we can be even more precise. 
Corollary 7.5. For a simple, positive program 9, assuming there is a conflation, 
(1) r;,(A) = true if c,(A) = true; 
(2) vk( A) = false iff V,(A) = false. 
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PROOF. If u,(A) = true then u,(A) is exact; hence L’~(A) = U,(A). Conversely, if 
v,(A) = true, then by inequality (1) above, true sr v,(A); hence u,(A) = true, since 
true is the largest member of B under the I, ordering. Part (2) is similar. 0 
For the simplest interlaced bilattice, FOUR, the only exact truth values are the 
classical ones, and the only consistent ones are these and I, so this corollary 
completely characterizes vk in such a case. In the previous section we observed 
that the operator associated with a simple, positive program, using the interlaced 
bilattice FOUR, embodies the behavior of both the classical T9 operator and the 
three-valued operator. Then the corollary above specializes to the following result: 
using FOUR, for a simple, positive program and for a ground atomic formula A, 
the least fixed point of the operator in the three-valued semantics assigns A the 
value true iff the least fixed point of TP assigns A true in the classical two-valued 
semantics; and the least fixed point of the three-valued operator assigns A false iff 
the greatest fixed point of T9 assigns A the value false. This result first appeared 
in [7], with a different proof, and with essentially the present proof in [lo]. 
The result from [7] about the interlaced bilattice FOUR just discussed has a 
rather far-reaching generalization, with which we conclude. Before stating it, we 
reformulate the result connecting the two- and the three-valued semantics in more 
algebraic terms. One reason this reformulation was not discovered earlier is that 
the appropriate algebraic operations are not evident until the full interlaced 
bilattice FOUR is considered. Specifically, we need the operation @ . 
In FOUR, for a simple, positive program 9, using the notation for least and 
greatest jixed points given earlier, one has vk = L’, C+ V,. 
The justification of this is easy. If v,(A) = true, then by Corollary 7.5, v,(A) = 
true; hence I/,(A) = true, since c, sr V,, and so (v, QD V,)(A) = true. If v,(A) = false, 
then (c, 8 V,)(A) = false by a similar argument, z:~(A) cannot be T by Proposition 
7.1. Finally, if Lag = I, by Proposition 7.3, C,(A) # V,(A), though both are 
exact, and it follows that (v, 8 I/,)(A) = I . 
Now, we generalize this in three directions. First, above we only considered the 
fixed points v,, V,, and uk. There are four extremal fixed points for a9 when 9 is 
positive. We intend to find relationships between them all. Second, the result 
above was only for positive, simple programs. The proof made use of simplicity in 
citing results about exactness and consistency. This restriction can be relaxed. Also 
the existence of a conflation operation was necessary, in order for exactness and 
consistency to make sense. Finally, the result above was only for the interlaced 
bilattice FOUR. We extend it to a broad class of bilattices including some, like 
SZX, with no conflation operation. 
An interlaced bilattice has four basic binary operations, @, 8, A, and v , and 
so there are twelve possible distributive laws: 
aA(bVc)=(aAb)V(aAc), 
aA(b@c)=(aAb)@(aAc), 
etc. 
Definition 7.2. We call an interlaced bilattice distributive if all twelve distributive 
laws hold. 
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NOTE. We will continue to refer to an interlaced distributive bilattice, but in 
fact this is somewhat redundant, since the distributivity laws imply the interlacing 
condition. For example, suppose a sk b, where sk is a lattice ordering. Then 
a $ b = b and so (a 8 b) A c = b A c. If we are allowed to distribute, this yields 
(a A c) $ (b A c) = b A c, and hence a A c sk b A c. The other interlacing condi- 
tions are established in a similar way. 
Distributive bilattices are fairly common. They include FOUR and SIX, for 
instance. This follows from a general result. 
Proposition 7.6. If C and D are distributive lattices, then @CC, D) is a distributive 
biluttice. 
PROOF. Straightforward checking. q 
Next, we remarked above that four, not three extremal fixed points were 
available for positive programs. We extend the notation used earlier, in the 
obvious way: if 9 is a positive (not necessarily simple) program, and @,Y is the 
associated operator on an interlaced bilattice of interpretations, then v, and V, are 
the least and greatest fixed points of a9 under the I, ordering, and vk and Vk 
are the least and greatest fixed points of QP under the I, ordering. Now, our 
main result is as follows. 
Theorem 7.7. Let 9 be a positive compound program, and suppose the interlaced 
biluttice B of truth values is distributive and finite. Then 
(1) Vk = v, Q V,, 
(2) V,=v,@v,, 
(3) v,=vkAVk, 
(4) v, = Vk v V,. 
Thus there is a nice, symmetric relationship between the extremal fixed points. 
The rest of this section is devoted to a proof of the proposition above, and can be 
omitted if you wish to avoid the technical details. 
Lemma 7.8. Suppose that in a distributive interlaced biluttice, a, I, A, and u2 I, A, 
(or a, sk A, and u2 sk A,). Then 
(u, @A,) A (uz @AZ) = (ul Au,) @ (A, AA*), 
(u, @A,) A (uz @AZ) = (u, Au,) @ (A, AA*)> 
(u, AA,) Q (u, AA,) = (u, =“a,) A (A, @A,), 
etc. 
PROOF. We show the first equality; the others are similar. Using a distributive law, 
(u,eA,)A(u,~A,)=(u,Au,)8(u,AA,)~(A,Au,)8(A,AA,)= *. 
If a, I, A, and u2 I, A,, then using the basic interlacing conditions, 
*I,(~,AU,)~(A,~\A,)~(A,AA,)~(A,AA,)=(U,~\~,)~(A,AA,). 
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SimiIarly 
* 2,(a,Aa,)~(a,Aa,)~((a,Au,)~((A,A~,)=(u,Au,)~(~,A~,). 
0 
Lemma 7.9. Suppose that in a finite, distributive interlaced biluttice, ai I, Ai for 
each i E 3 (or ui I, Ai for each i E 3). Then 
A (ai@Ai) = A a,@ A Ai, 
ie3 ie4 is3 
A (u~@A~)= Aup AA~, 
is/ iE> iE4 
PROOF. As in the previous lemma; since the interlaced bilattice is assumed to be 
finite, the “infinitary” operations are really finitary ones. q 
Proposition ZlO. Suppose B is a finite, distributive interlaced biluttice, v and V are 
interpretations of the language L(Y) in B, and 4 is a closed, positive formula. If 
v<,Vorv<,V, then 
(1) (v @ V-X4) = u(4) @ V(4), 
(2) (v @ VX4) = UC+) Q V(4), 
(3) (v A V)(4) = v(4) A V(4), 
(4) (v v V>($> = u(4) v V(4). 
NOTE. The operations on the left are the induced ones in the interlaced 
bilattice of interpretations, which need not be finite. The operations on the right 
are in the finite interlaced bilattice B. 
PROOF. By induction on the complexity of 4. If C$ is ground atomic, the result is 
immediate from the definitions of the pointwise orderings in the space of interpre- 
tations, and does not depend on the inequalities between v and V. We consider 
one of the induction cases, as a representative example. Suppose C$ is Clx)~,Mx), 
and (1) is known for formulas simpler than 4, in particular for G(d) for each d in 
the work-space domain D. Then 
(u @ V)(4) = (u @ V)((3x)+(x)) 
= v (u@ V($(d)) 
d‘=D 
=d~D[~(Wl) WW))l (by induction hypothesis) 
= d~D4+(4) @ v V(9(4) (by Lemma 7.9) 
deD 
= 4(3x)~(x)) @ V((3x)+(x)) 
‘44) @V(4). 0 
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Finally we come to the proof of Theorem 7.7 itself. 
PROOF. Smallest and biggest fixed points are approached via a transfinite sequence 
of approximations. We use the following notation to represent this. (L’,)() is the 
smallest interpretation in the I, direction. For an arbitrary ordinal IX, (u,),,, = 
@,<(u~),>. Finally, for a limit ordinal A, (ur)* = V, <*(u,)~. As usual, the sequence 
(u~>~ is monotone increasing in (Y (a <p implies (u,), sr (u,&). And for some 
ordinal w, (u,), = c,, the least fixed point of @:+ in the I, ordering. In fact, from 
that stage on, things remain fixed; that is, if LY > 00 then (u,), = u,. 
More notation. (V,),is the largest interpretation in the sr ordering. (V,),,, = 
@,((V,),). And for limit A, (V,), = A,<,(V,>,. Then (V,), decreases in the sr 
ordering, and for some ordinal 00, (V,), = V,. Finally we use CC,), and (V,), 
analogously, but with sk , C, and IYl playing the roles that I, , V, and A played 
above. 
Now to show item (1) of Theorem 7.7, say, u k = U, @ V,, it is enough to show by 
transfinite induction that, for each ordinal CY, (c’~)~ = (u,), 8 (V,),. Items (2), (3) 
and (4) are proved in exactly the same way. 
Initial case. Let A be ground atomic. Because the initial interpretations are 
smallest and greatest in their respective orderings, (u,),(A) = I , (u,),(A) = 
false, and (V,),(A) = true, so (u,),(A) = (u,),,(A) @ (V,),,(A) by Proposition 
3.1. Thus (U~)~ = (ut& @ (v,),. 
Induction case. Suppose (u,), = (u,), @ <V,),. Let A = P(d,, . . . , d,,) be ground 
atomic, and suppose P is unreserved. Say P(x,, . . . , xn) + 4(x,, . . . , x,) is the 
clause of program 9 for P. Then 
(U/f)a+,(A) = (Uk)a+l(P(dl,...,d,)) 
= ~~((L’k),)(P(d,,...,d,)) 
= (%&(CC.JJ) 
= [(u,),@(~),]($(d,,...,d,)) (byinductionhypothesis) 
= (Q&C&..., d,)) @ (v,),(+C.J,)) 
(by Proposition 7.10) 
=~~((u,),)(P(d,,...,d,))~~~((V,),)(P(d*,...,d,)) 
= (C’t),+,(P(dl,...,d,)) @ (v,),+,(P(d,~...J,)) 
= (%),+1(A) @ (V,),+,(A). 
If P is unreserved but there is no program clause for P, or if P is reserved, 
then (a,),+,(A) = (u,),+i(A) @ (V,),+,(A) trivially. Hence (~~)~+i = 
(%),+I @ (v,),+i. 
Limit case. Suppose (u~)~ = (u~)~ @ (V,), for every (Y <A, where A is a limit 
ordinal. Let A be ground atomic. Then (u,),(A) = CC, <A(~k),XA) = 
E,IA(~k)a(A). Since the interlaced bilattice B is finite, and (ukjol is increas- 
ing with CY in the sk ordering, there must be an at, < A such that 
C,,,(u,),(A) = (uk&,CA>. Further, for any ordinal p with (~a I p 5 A we 
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must have (L:~),,$A) = (~,la(A) = (u,),(A). Similarly, using the facts that 
CL!,), is increasing and (V,>, is decreasing in the I, ordering, there must be 
ordinals (Y,, CY~ <h such that (Y, I p I A = (U&o) = (U&41 = (L’,)*(A) = 
V,.,(u,),(A) and (Ye I p 5 A =z3 0Q&41= (Q&41 = (I/,),(A) = 
A, <h(4)o(A). Now, let y = maxlcy,,, cy,, CYJ. Then, since y <A, we can use 
the induction hypothesis, and so 
(Q1*(4 = (G)&4 
= [MY@ (V,),](A) 
= (GM4 @ KM4 
= ((J,>,(A) @(v,),(A). 
Hence (~‘~1~ = (rj,),, ~3 (VflA. 
This concludes the proof. 0 
8. CONCLUSION 
Interlaced bilattices provide a simple, elegant setting for the consideration of 
logic-programming extensions allowing for incomplete or contradictory answers. 
On a theoretical level a considerable unification of several ideas is achieved. 
Though in the abstract all interlaced bilattices are quite natural, in practice not all 
are appropriate for computer implementation. A version based on FOUR is a 
practical goal, taking the Prolog implementation of the classical logic-programming 
paradigm as a model. An implementation along these lines may be found in [Ill. 
Also, logic programming using @([O, 11, [O, 11) should be possible as an extension of 
the version proposed in [20]. In other cases desirability and practicality are issues 
that remain to be decided. We hope interlaced bilattices will provide the same 
kind of motivation, for future logic-programming language development, that the 
classical semantics has supplied heretofore. 
REFERENCES 
1. 
2. 
6. 
Apt, K. R. and van Emden, M. H., Contributions to the Theory of Logic Programming, 
J. Assoc. Comput. Mach. 29:841-862 (1982). 
Apt, K. R., Blair, H. A., and Walker, A., Towards a Theory of Declarative Knowledge, 
in: J. Minker (ed.), Foundations of Deductive Databases and Logic Programming, 
Morgan Kaufmann, 1987, pp. 89-148. 
Belnap, N. D., Jr., A Useful Four-Valued Logic, in: J. Michael Dunn and G. Epstein 
teds.), Modern Uses of Multiple-Valued Logic, Reidel, 1977, pp. 8-37. 
Blair, H. A., Brown, A. L., and Subrahmanian, V. S., A Logic Programming Semantics 
Scheme, Technical Report LPRG-TR-88-8, Syracuse Univ., 1988. 
Blair, H. A. and Subrahmanian, V. S., Paraconsistent Logic Programming, in: Proceed- 
ings of the 7th Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical 
Computer Science, Lecture Notes in Comput. Sci. 287, Springer. 
Clark, K. L., Negation as Failure, in: H. Gallaire and J. Minker feds.), Logic and 
Databases, Plenum, New York, 1978, pp. 293-322; reprinted in M. L. Ginsberg ted.), 
Readings in Nonmonotonic Reasoning, Morgan Kaufmann, Los Altos, Calif., 1987, 
pp. 311-325. 
116 MELVIN FI’l-llNG 
7. Fitting, M. C., A Kripke/Kleene Semantics for Logic Programs, J. Logic Programming, 
1985, pp. 295-312. 
8. Fitting, M. C., Partial Models and Logic Programming, Theoret. Comput. Sci. 48229-255 
(1986). 
9. Fitting, M. C., Computability Theory, Semantics, and Logic Programming, Oxford U.P., 
1987. 
10. Fitting, M. C., Logic Programming on a Topological Bilattice, Fund. Inform. 11:209-218 
(1988). 
11. Fitting, M. C., Negation as Refutation, in: Proceedings of the Fourth Annual Symposium 
on Logic in Computer Science, 63-70 (1989) IEEE. 
12. Fitting, M. C. and Ben-Jacob, M., Stratified and Three-Valued Logic Programming 
Semantics, in: R. A. Kowalski and K. A. Bowen (eds.), Logic Programming, Proceedings 
of the Fifth International Conference and Symposium, MIT Press, 1988, pp. 1054-1069. 
13. Fitting, M. C. and Ben-Jacob, M., Stratified, Weak Stratified and Three-Valued Seman- 
tics, Fund. Inform. 13:19-33 (1990). 
14. Ginsberg, M. L., Multi-valued Logics, in: Proceedings of AAAI-86, Fifth National 
Conference on Arti’cial Intelligence, Morgan Kaufmann, 1986, pp. 243-247. 
15. Ginsberg, M. L., Multivalued Logics: A Uniform Approach to Inference in Artificial 
Intelligence, Comput. Intelligence 4, No. 3. 
16. Kleene, S. C., Introduction to Metamathematics, Van Nostrand, 1950. 
17. Kunen, K., Negation in Logic Programming, J. Logic Programming, 1987, pp. 289-308. 
18. Kunen, K., Signed Data Dependencies in Logic Programs, J. Logic Programming 
7:231-245 (1989). 
19. Tarski, A., A Lattice-Theoretical Fixpoint Theorem and Its Applications, Pacific J. 
Math., 5:285-309 (1955). 
20. van Emden, M., Quantitative Deduction and Its Fixpoint Theory, J. Logic Programming 
3:37-53 (1986). 
21. van Emden, M. and Kowalski, R. A., The Semantics of Predicate Logic as a Program- 
ming Language, .I. Assoc. Comput. Mach. 231733-742 (1976). 
22. Visser, A., Four Valued Semantics and the Liar, J. Philos. Logic 13:181-212 (1984). 
